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Abstract  
 Globalization has influences on economies of all countries. Not only the capital but 
commodities became very important part of global mobility. Many countries tried to 
cooperate and collaborate to adopt their own national law and principles for both capital 
mobility and commodity mobility. However, in international trade, there are observations 
about trade of either illegal goods or trading international but caused to international money 
laundering.   This paper will analyse money laundering mechanism based on the trade of 
goods and services, commonly known as trade based money laundering. Specifically, Turkey 
will be the specific case. 
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Introduction  
 Money laundering is defined as the conversion of criminal incomes into assets that 
cannot be traced back to the underlying crimes. The number and scope of laws and 
regulations for overcoming money laundering have expanded dramatically within last 
decades.  
 Money laundering is conventionally divided into three phases: placement of funds 
derived from illegal activity layering of those funds by passing them through many 
institutions and jurisdictions to disguise their origin and integration of the funds into an 
economy where they appear to be legitimate. Although, the anti-money laundering regime has 
many objectives including the goals of reducing crime, preserving financial system integrity 
and controlling terrorism corruption and failed states. 
 In this paper, the money laundering activities through international trade will be 
analysed. The main focus will be on Turkish economy.  
Trade based money laundering 
 Many criminals seek to disguise the origins of their criminally derived funds by 
engaging in money laundering to enable them to benefit from their criminals and avoid 
detection by the authorities. Organized criminals follow their benefits to money laundering to 
enhance their lifestyle and to the profits of their crimes to be reinvested in future criminal 
activities or in legitimate business operations.  
 Trade based money laundering (TBML) is to disguise proceeds of crime and to mask 
legitimately obtained funds that are directed towards terrorism and other criminal activity 
(Sullivan and Smith, 2013). TBML techniques vary from simple fraud such as the 
misrepresentation of prices, quantity or quality of goods on an invoice to complex networks 
of trade and financial transactions. While TBML schemes most commonly involve the 
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misinterpretation of price, quantity or the type of merchandise, trade in intangibles (such as 
information and services) is emerging as a significant new TBML frontier also known as 
service based money laundering. Trade based money laundering obscure the true origin of 
funds. TBML does not include transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments and 
the services provided by alternative remittance dealers. The growth in volume and value of 
world trade and the relative ease of disguising the true nature of the trade and the relative ease 
of disguising the true nature of the trade made attractive money launderer very attractive 
(Sullivan and Smith, 2013). Increased reporting and analysis of financial transactions as a 
result of anti-money laundering counter terrorism financing initiatives made trade more 
attractive as a vehicle for money laundering( Financial Action Task Force, FATF, 2006).   
 Trade based money laundering includes a variety of schemes that enable the cash to be 
separated from the crime early in the money laundering process. The most common methods 
of trade based money laundering in the USA was the  Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE)  
in which Colombian drug trafficker swap illicit dollars in the United States for clean pesos in 
Colombia. Other methods include manipulating trade documents to over or under pay imports 
and exports and using criminal proceeds to buy gems or precious metals.  
 Trade based money laundering schemes often allow criminals to distance themselves 
from the money laundering process, complicating law enforcement investigations. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the USA analysed outbound trade data and 
financial and payment data including forms mandated by the Currency Report, Report of 
International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments, Report of Cash Payments 
over $10.000 received in a trade or Business and the Suspicious Activity Report in an effort to 
spot the anomalies that would indicate trade based money laundering. The Drug Enforcement 
Administration investigates narcotics money laundering, regularly   
 Criminal Organization may resort to a number of alternatives to the BMPE for 
transferring value into or out of the country. Each of these methods based on the misuse of 
international trade documents. Among the most frequently encountered schemes are over and 
undervaluation, misclassification and double invoicing. Each of these schemes is a separate 
offense that may also be an element of the crime of money laundering  
 Two of the most common schemes on money laundering are over and under valuation. 
If the invoice overstates the true value of the related merchandise, it means the importers pay 
more for the merchandise than it is truly worth. This is considered as justification for the 
importer to move money offshore for the imported goods. An undervaluation scheme is the 
same thing in reverse. An importer receives merchandise that is worth more than declared in 
the invoice. When the importer sells the undervalued merchandise, he receives more than the 
value reflected in the official documentation. If the transferred value represents illicit 
proceeds, the result is money laundering. Business have attempted to over and under value 
trade goods in an effort to dodge government trade deficit, taxes or other fees based on the 
value of the merchandise sent or received. 
 Foreign Trade Zones application is another method for facilitate money laundering. 
Although, original it aims to promote manufacturing in the host country. When the 
manufacturers import parts and materials outside of a Foreign Trade Zone they pay import 
duties based on the value of the finished product rather than the value of the components 
parts. Manufacturers defer, reduce or even eliminated the Customs duties at foreign trade s 
zone. Total value of money laundering as in free trade zone in the USA was considered $250 
billion at 2006. Often criminal operations within Free Trade Zone involve some type of 
import export scheme. False documentation involves fabricated Bills of Lading and fictitious 
names and addresses are used to misrepresents imports and exports often with customers 
broker who is in collusion with the criminals, “brokering” the documents. 
 Transfer pricing as a means of shifting taxable income from the country in which it 
was earned to another country in order to minimize tax ( Boyrie et al, 2005) 
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 Precious commodities and metals can be used as alternative to cash to transfer value 
across borders. Like gold and other precious metals, diamonds are attractive to money 
launderers because they are easily concealed and transported and because they are mined in 
remote areas of the world and are virtually untraceable to their original source. Even when 
diamonds are transported openly, it is relatively easy to mislabel the quality value of a 
diamond for money laundering purposes. There is growing worldwide recognition of the need 
to scrutinize unusual trade patterns involving commodities. An example is “conflict 
diamonds” emerging from West African do not have resources of diamond countries and 
exported to Belgium ( FATF  :50) . The  FATF report explains money laundering as 
follows:   
Payments to vendor made in cash by unrelated third parties 
Payments to vendor made via wire transfers from unrelated third parties 
Payments to vendor made via checks, bank drafts or postal money orders from unrelated third 
parties 
False reporting: such as commodity misclassification, commodity over-valuation or under-
valuation 
Carousel transactions: the repeated importation and exportation of the same high-value 
commodity 
Commodities being traded do not match the business involved 
Unusual shipping routes or trans-shipment points 
Packaging inconsistent with commodity or shipping method (FATC, 2008) 
 
Studies on trade based money laundering  
 Lall (1973) investigated over-invoicing by a small sample of Colombian 
pharmaceutical firms with foreign affiliates. The governmental restrictions on profit 
repatriation were important issue in international trade. Foreign exchange and capital controls 
in Colombia during the 1960s stimulated multinational firms to raise their intra-firm prices 
above the arm’s-length level as a means of transferring profits out of the country. Lall finds 
that related-party prices ranged 33 to 300 per cent higher than arm’s-length prices in local, 
regional and world markets during 1968 to 1970.  
 At 2001, Swenson studied the relationship between country corporate tax (and tariff) 
rates and transfer prices. Swenson (2001), using annual U.S. import data for five countries 
during the 1980s, analysed the response of average unit values across all (unobserved) 
transactions within country-product pairs to variations in U.S. import tariffs and foreign tax 
rates. She finds evidence that changes in prices are consistent with incentives based on taxes 
and tariffs but that the economic magnitudes are small.16.  
 Clausing (2003) used data on import and export product prices collected by the Bureau 
of Labour Statistics (BLS) from 1997 to 1999 to investigate the effect of country corporate tax 
rates on related-party prices. The BLS data separately identify intra-firm and arm’s-length 
transactions. Clausing found out price responses in the expected directions, i.e., higher taxes 
abroad are associated with higher export prices and lower import prices for related-party 
transactions. She estimates suggest that a 1 per cent drop in taxes abroad reduces U.S. export 
prices between related parties by 0.9 to 1.8 percent.1 
 
Anti -money laundering legislation  
 The anti- money laundering effort by the United States began with the passage in 1970 
of the Bank Secrecy Act, which was largely domestic in nature and covered only depository 
institutions. The 1970 Bank Secrecy as amended by the USA. Patriot Act forms the legal 
framework for governmental bodies to implement the country’s anti money laundering 
policies. Initially, US Money Laundering (AML) focused on organized crime groups in 
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particular, war on drug. After September 11, 2001, terrorist financing activities received more 
attention. This change in emphasis had several motivations, some well-intentioned and others 
more cynical- simply seizing on anxiety over national security to strengthen US AML that 
many specialists had been seeking for years.  
 The 2005 Money Laundering Threat Assessment is the first government wide analysis 
of money laundering in the United States. The report is the product of an interagency working 
group composed of experts from the spectrum of US Government. In the USA, comparing 
domestic and foreign import-export data to detect discrepancies in the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule, country of origin, manufacturer, importer-exporter, ultimate consignee, broker, unit 
price, commodity activity by the time period, and port of import –export.  
 Analysing financial information collected to identify patterns of activity involving the 
importation –exportation of currency, deposits of currency in financial institutions, reports of 
suspicious financial activities and the identity of parties to these transactions. Examining 
domestic import data with an automated technique, such as Unit Price Analysis to compare 
the average unit price for a particular commodity and identify traders who are importing 
commodities at a substantially higher or lower price than the world market.  
 Comparing information such as the origin, description and value of the goods, 
particulars of the consignee and consignor and the route of shipment with intelligence 
information in existing databases to detect any irregularities, targets or risk indicators.  
 Using statistical analysis methods such as linear regression models, on trade data 
concerning individual non aggregated imports and exports.  
 Comparing export information with tax declarations to detect discrepancies.  
 Paying particular attention to trade transactions that display known flag indicators of 
TBML FT activity.  
 Cross comparing known typologies of risk with trade data, information on cross 
border monetary transfers associated with the payment of goods, intelligence tax and wealth 
information  
 After recognizing anomalies and discrepancies in trade and financial transactions are 
identified, appropriate follow up action could involve asking the trader for further explanation 
and supporting documents, auditing traders who have presented discrepancies to check the 
volume of their business regularity of their operations, the kind of goods exported and 
connections with organized crime or any other illicit activity, and or making the completed 
analysis available to the investigate authorities( Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 2006)  
In the European Union, the money laundering has been accepted an evident influence on the 
rise of organized crime in general and drug trafficking in particular, whereas there is more and 
more awareness that combating money laundering is one of the most effective means of 
opposing this form of criminal activity which constitutes a particular threat to Member States 
societies.  
 Whereas money laundering must be combated mainly by penal means and within the 
framework of international cooperation among judicial and law  enforcement authorities as 
has been undertaken in the field of drugs by the United  Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic, Substances adopted on December 1988 in 
Vienna and more generally in relation to all criminal activities by the Council of Europe 
Convention on laundering, tracing, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime, opened for 
signature on 8 November 1990 in Strasburg. The recommendation of the Council of Europe 
27 June 1980 and to the declaration of principles adopted in December 1988 in Basle by the 
banking supervisory authorities of the Group of Ten  
 In the European Union Countries, the money laundering means the following conduct 
when committed intentionally: the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for 
the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any 
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person who is involved in the commission of such activity to evade the legal consequences of 
his action.  
 The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to or ownership of property, knowing that such property is 
derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity.  
 The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the time of receipt that such 
property was derived from criminal activity or from act of participation in such activity.  
 In this Directive property defined as assets of every kind, whether corporeal, movable 
or immovable, tangible or intangible and legal documents or instruments evidencing title or 
interest in such assets.  
 Member States shall ensure that credit and financial institution require identification of 
their customers by means of supporting evidence when entering into business relations, 
particularly when opening a deposit account or savings accounts or when offering safe 
custody facilities.  
 The identification requirement shall also apply for transaction with customers other 
than those referred to in paragraph 1, involving a sum amounting ECU 15000, whether 
transaction is carried out single operation or in several operations which seem to be linked. 
Where the sum is not known at the time when the transaction is undertaken, the institution 
concerned shall proceed with identification as soon as it is appraised of the document. 
 Switzerland is an example of special case. Switzerland’s banking institution could be 
recognized as facilitators of the movement and the repositories of capital from other countries. 
In 1998, Switzerland broadened the reach of its Code of Conduct on due diligence and the 
money laundering policy to include not only banks but the entire financial sector as well. This 
act had been put into effect by 1998 ( Boyrie et al 2005)  
 Transfer pricing in the Middle East region has special importance in terms of money 
laundering through Multi-National Companies (MNC)s. In this region, the large numbers of 
Multi-National companies based on European and the USA and Canada operate. The Middle 
East region is at the initial stage of the transfer pricing lifecycle where transfer pricing and 
international tax regimes were being developed (Axelsen and Rossel, 2012: 4). Favourable 
taxing principles in the Middle East Region offer opportunity for multi-national companies. 
High domestic withholding tax rates compared to domestic rates of corporate taxation and 
lack of a treaty network within the Middle East region attract high levels of taxation at source 
and scrutiny under audit. If an MNC’s operating companies are set up as full risk and 
therefore subject to various outbound transactions within the country of operation, all such 
transactions are subject to relatively high domestic withholding tax rates which in many 
instances will not be eligible for treaty relief. Tax Law allows the arm’s length principle as 
stated by Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and thus 
general acceptance of many of their standard and global transfer pricing policies. The reality 
is that tax authority acceptance of the arm’s length principle throughout the region is mixes 
and as a general rule forms over substance tends to prevail. As such presence of a legal 
contract and documentation supporting the charges and illustrating that the legal contract and 
policy has been administered as intended are often more important than trying to explain the 
substance of a transactions. It can be challenging to explain that a limited risk distributor 
should earn an arm’s length operating margin and cost of goods sold is valued accordingly in 
an effort to target such a margin as opposed to being able to tie the transaction back to a 
schedule of actual costs and profits earned by the seller of the goods.  The legal contract 
alone, if interpreted by a tax authority a s “ reasonable and “ arm’s length agreement may 
suffice.  
 Money Laundering in Turkish Economy  and Transfer Pricing 
 Turkey became the part of Vienna Convention on money laundering illegal drug 
traffic and Psychotrop at  1995. Although, the first initiatives started by membership to FATF 
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at 1991. However, Turkey did not  sign the Strasburg Convention  on money laundering on 
criminal gains.  These were just after first experience of Turkish economy on fraud in export 
by untrue export of furniture at 19175 ( Hurriyet , 2012 ).    
  2007, the transfer pricing rules have been put into effect in Turkish economy by 2007. 
 The Article 13 of the Corporate Income Tax Law (CITL No.5520) under the title of 
“Disguised Profit Distribution through Transfer Pricing” states the arm’s length principles. 
The regulations under Article 13 follow the arm’s length principle, established by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD Guidelines, 2013) and are 
applicable to all financial, economic and commercial transactions and employment relations 
between related parties. As follows:  the term corporation covers: capital stock companies, 
cooperatives; public economic enterprises; economic enterprises of associations or 
foundations and joint ventures.  
 Related party definition of the Turkish Transfer Pricing regulations is very broad and 
it included direct or indirect involvement in the management or control in addition to the 
existence of shareholder- ownership relationship. In addition to transactions with foreign 
group companies, it also includes transactions with entities that are based in tax havens or in 
jurisdictions that are considered to be harmful tax regimes by the Turkish government. Within 
the framework, the concept of related party is broadly defined under Article 13 of CTIL 
No.5520  
 The concepts of ‘related party” covers shareholders of the corporation, legal entities or 
individuals related to the corporation or its shareholders; legal entities or individuals related to 
the corporation or its shareholders. Legal entities or individuals which control the corporation 
directly in terms of management, supervision or capita; legal entities or individuals which are 
controlled by the corporation directly or indirectly in terms of management, supervision or 
capital. 
 The Transfer Pricing rules define certain methods for the determination of arm’s 
length transfer prices. The methods adopted are comprehensively explained by the OECD 
Guidelines are as follows: Comparable uncontrolled price method; Cost plus method, resale 
price method. In the case where these methods cannot be applied, the company may apply 
other methods: profit split method and transactional net margin method. 
In the comparable uncontrolled price methods, if the internal comparable are sufficient to 
reach an arm’s length price, there is no need to find an external comparable. If there is no 
internal comparable, external comparable should be used after making a comparability 
analysis and the necessary adjustments.     
 In addition to the specific transfer pricing regulations, additional requirements or rule 
covering transfer pricing contained in other legislation include: Turkish tax procedural law 
article with regard to the determination of the market value of goods and Turkish value added 
tax law article stating if the tax base for goods and services is unknown, the market prices 
based on the nature of the transactions will be the tax base.  
In recent years, the Turkish Ministry of Finance significantly increased its number of transfer 
pricing audits against companies with a particular emphasis on the pharmaceutical, 
automotive and fast moving consumer goods sector. In the course of these audits, the Ministry 
of Finance has focused on the following transfer pricing issues  
 Pricing of raw materials traded amongst related parties, with the government relying 
on industrial benchmarking studies that omit relevant risk and functions.  
 Continuous losses in previous years by companies that operate primarily through 
related companies abroad.  
 Management fees and indirect cost allocation.  
Yearend adjustments. 
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would be considered some methods of money laundering (Price Water House Coopers 
Consulting, 2013  
 WTO groups the measures against subsidies, all anti-dumping provisions to protect 
local producers as well as all protection and surveillance measures under the heading of “trade 
policy deference tools”. In this respect, Turkey started surveillance on imports starting from 
generally regardless of county of origin. However, considering the fact that domestic 
producers are faced with heightened competitive pressure from imports originating especially 
from China, the majority of the imported products subject to surveillance can be through of 
China origin.  
 Measures against subsidies, all anti-dumping provisions to protect local producer, as 
well as all protection and surveillance measures under the heading of “trade policy defence 
tools were grouped by World Trade Organization. Turkey only started surveillance on imports 
at 2004.   Decree on import surveillance issued by May 29, 2004 states the methods and 
principles of closely monitoring the developments in the imports of products in consideration 
(Decree with number, 2004). The decree on surveillance assigns a committee to examine 
import practice and its possible threats. Especially import from China is very important threat 
to Turkish economy.   After surveillance is imposed to a particular product, a documentation 
system is put into practice. The surveillance form includes the number, place and date of 
importation, the nature, origin and commercial definition of the product, the name of the 
exporting/importing firm, quantity, value and price of the transaction. In order to fulfil the 
requirements to get this form, importers should provide some standard documents before the 
Ministry of Economy In their studies, Aktas and Aldan (2013) analysed the mismatch in 
international trade of Turkey through import surveillance. The main argument on their studies 
was the surveillance practice results in higher than real CIF values. According to their studies, 
the import surveillance has worsening impact on total import bill. One of the important 
reasons was cheap imports are recorded at higher prices than their actual worth. The other one 
was the fact that importers would like to avoid documentation work, importer pay different 
amount other than the amount stated in the invoice.  This in turn would add a positive amount 
to net errors and omissions. Indeed, net errors and omissions, which fluctuated around zero in 
the period of 1992-2002, are positive straight since 2004, indicating systematic disturbance of 
which import surveillance practice might be one of the potential causes (Aktas and Aldan, 
2013:8). Aktas and Aldan found out significant effect of import surveillance on import prices, 
that is, over invoicing of imports. The effect is clearer in the trade data with China. They 
suggest that, Turkish import figures could be inflated about 2 to 3 billion dollars as of 2011 
and rising since total imports are increasing due to economic growth and the number of 
commodities under surveillance system. 
 In Turkey, Aktas and Aldan (2013) studied the net errors and omission in the analysis 
of the balance of payments in Turkey. They explained the data of 1995. In 1995, the Central 
Bank of Turkey explained the other income in balance of payments. 3.5 billion USD is 
construction and freight income, the other remaining is 0.5 billion TL income held in 
consulates, commission revenue; 2.4 billion USD was declared as income by the people who 
are resident in Turkey and exchanged their foreign exchange to TL. However, they assumed 
that 1.5 million USD is the amount that cannot be announced and basically the money 
transferred Turkey to launder. The German authorities also announced more than 1 billion 
Deutsche Mark was transferred as cash by the individual at 1995. Similarly, at 1998, the total 
amount of money transferred to Turkey by illegal methods was considered as 100 trillion 
USD. The source of income was not inquired in those years where the need for capital was so 
high in Turkey. The announcement made by the Central Bank of Turkey also confirms the 2.4 
billion USD dollar is the money which the source is unknown and cannot be explained. The 
former President of the Central Bank estimated the amount of money transferred for 
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laundering purposes as 1.5 billion USD $ or more at 1996.  Similarly this amount was 
estimated as 100 trillion TL (375 billion USD $) at 1998  
- foreign exchange of labour working abroad 
- tourism income  
- income obtained from construction business abroad.  
- freight income 
 People who are residence in foreign countries were allowed to have a Deutsche Mark 
currency deposit account with the limit of DM 50.000. as long as they invest to this account , 
they were allowed to buy automobile free of charges.  Total value of the accounts which are 
open to get benefit of the decree with the number of 1996 8486 was 1.772.524.404 DM at 
1998.  
 Here, in this paper, the net error and omission information have been analysed. Larger 
time period had been taken into consideration in the graph below (Graph 1), the data for net 
error and omissions from 1984 to 2013 have been represented. Accordingly, due to 
liberalisation policies starting by 1980’s, the net error and omission part of the balance of 
payments of Turkey has been raising tremendously. Early years of liberalisation, the net error 
and omission were less than the recent years.  
Graph 1: Net Errors and Omission in Balance of Payments in Turkey 
 
Source: The Central Bank of Republic of Turkey http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/cbt-uk.html 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 Combating with money laundering is important issue in all economies. Due to 
globalization, international mobility of commodity and capital increased, the raising mobility 
also raised the number of transactions and documentation. Sometimes some of the companies 
may overprice their invoices. Turkey has been considered as one of the area money 
laundering is possible. Although, all related regulations and legislation have been made, still 
certain amount of money laundering could be forecasted under the net errors and omission of 
balance of payments of Turkey. The analysis made in this paper showed that the net error and 
omission of the balance of payment in Turkey has been increasing since 1984. The large part 
of these bias have been considered due to the over-invoicing. This is one of the money 
laundering through international trade.  
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